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• A Fiscal Impact Analysis (FIA) is a process to better understand the costs and benefits 
of investment through development projects in public goods, most notably in 
infrastructure investment. 
 
• FIAs are generally oriented to more local places such as cities and towns, while 
economic impacts are more regionwide (although for regional entities such as sewer 
and water, the FIA may be regional). 
 
• There is agreement in the literature that local governments are the best entity to 
provide infrastructure as they are closest to the users (residential and business) and 
better understand their needs.  
 
• FIAs can be based on either average cost data or marginal cost data. While average 
costs are easier to get, they often do not accurately describe local conditions, 
particularly how existing capacities may be affected.  
 
• Using either source of data, the FIA may be off-the-shelf or custom built. The strength 
of the former is cost and ease, while the latter is more costly but will provide a more 
relevant study to jurisdiction.  
 
• There are tradeoffs between density and harshness of place. Density and 
agglomeration, both localized and urbanized, may save costs. However, that may also 
lead to harshness of the environment, such as congestion and crime, which may 
raise costs. 
 
• With agglomeration economies, spillovers or externalities (both positive and negative) 
may accrue to nearby jurisdictions. Depending on funding sources and levels of 
regionalization, externalities may be included in an FIA. 
 
• While there are costs and benefits to agglomeration, the recent COVID-19 pandemic 














The location decisions of firms have many repercussions for local communities. Where firms 
locate changes the character of regions and may introduce sprawl or affect density. Location 
decisions have ramifications for housing developments, transportation systems, public 
infrastructure, educational and workforce training systems, and utilities. The construction of 
the built environment and locations of businesses are some of the building blocks of 
economic development, making it important to understand the fiscal impacts of 
development on communities and regions.  
 
The purpose of this literature review is to examine exactly how to calculate the fiscal impact 
of development on a community.  Fiscal Impact Analysis (FIA) is a commonly used tool in 
planning. The use of FIAs is to assist planners in making decisions about land use in a 
region or community (Edwards & Huddleston, 2009).  They are also used to create estimates 
of costs and returns from development (Paulsen, 2009). “When well done, FIA can help 
communities better understand the fiscal benefits and burdens brought about by a change 
in the built environment…” (Read et al., 2019, p. 53). 
 
This literature review finds that there are multiple ways to calculate these impacts. Unlike 
the economic modeling literature, where REMI, IMPLAN, and RIMS are, at least currently, the 
dominate models, the fiscal impact literature does not embrace a generally accepted model 
or models. In modelling fiscal impacts, impacts can be focused on a variety and combination 
of uses including but not limited to, residential, industrial, commercial/retail, office, amenity, 
and mixed use. Each of these types of uses and mixes of uses creates different costs and 
benefits as part of their modeling. Each of these uses has implications for their development 
aside from direct costs and benefits, including externalities and political implications and 
consequences. All combined, this makes fiscal impact modeling a challenging endeavor to 






Fiscal versus Economic Impacts 
 
For purposes of discussion it is necessary to distinguish between fiscal and economic 
impacts. Although not discussed within the literature, but for purposes of this review, Fiscal 
Impact Analysis (FIA) is assumed to look at the impacts on a very limited space or 
jurisdiction such as a town, city, or county. The goal is to better understand the effects 
(mostly costs and benefits) to a place from new development. It helps to answer the 
question as to whether “real estate development in its various forms ‘pays for itself’…” 
(Read et al., 2019, p. 55). Economic impact analysis also uses, at least in most cases, the 
county as a building block for developing data and as the smallest level unit of analysis. 
Much of the economic impact work is done at the regional or state level and is based on a 
wider set of impacts. These impacts usually encompass not only changes to employment, 
but also output/sales, gross product, and personal income as a summary, and can also offer 
detailed levels of impacts at a more granular level including migration and demographic 
data. The economic impacts for the region include not only direct impacts, but also those 
that are indirect (suppliers) and induced (households).  Some economic impact models are 
able to create estimates at the sub-county level including cities, zip codes, and 






Why Conduct a Fiscal Impact Analysis? 
 
Part of the reason for conducting a Fiscal Impact Analysis (FIA) is to better understand how a 
city may use their resources to fund projects. As Edwards and Huddleston (2009) noted, 
places are using special assessments such as tax increment financing (TIF), developer’s 
agreements, and impact fees to pay for growth. By looking at the costs and benefits over 
time, the net outcomes can help address short-run losses with long-run gains (Read, et al. 
2019). There are several ways in which infrastructure might be paid for, either as an 
expenditure or using alternative methods that keep new infrastructure “off the books.” “If 
the local government expended $1 million, that would show up on its balance sheet. 
However, if the local government gave tax credits of $1 million this would not necessarily 
show up as a line item in the budget, even though revenue forecasts would reflect the 
credit” (Paulsen, 2009, p. 8). Examples of this include TIFs that channel forgone future 
revenues into debt amortization and tax abatements accruing to the developer or firm. Both 
TIFs and abatements help to recover value of improvements with different paths to offset 
development and operating costs.  
 
Much of the literature tends to focus on residential development and its impacts on both 
equity and marginal costs. Within this review, a greater focus will be placed on 
nonresidential development, such as industrial and commercial. As noted elsewhere, this 
may be a little easier as the nature of this type of development is a bit more straightforward 
because many of the inputs and outcomes are more easily defined. As an example, 100 new 
homes may have an array of households with different demographic conditions. The varied 
distribution of family type (age, children, income, and others) may require a complex set of 
assumptions based on how that distribution will affect schools, recreation, transportation, 
and other public goods. Arguably, a plastics manufacturer with 100 employees is a more 
defined entity and the demands on public sector services are more easily known. With 
business-related development, there are opportunities for additional revenue sources, 
including but not limited to “sales tax, meal and lodging taxes, plus business, professional 






The Structure of a Fiscal Impact Analysis 
 
At the very heart of Fiscal Impact Analyses (FIAs), there are both off-the-shelf models as well 
as custom designed models. These models, or “workbooks,” have been around since the 
late 1970’s and made “FIA possible for practitioners in that they provided methods, 
multipliers, and data sources for use in jurisdictions of all sizes” (Paulsen, 2009, p. 1). The 
dilemma with the off-the-shelf models is they tend to be a bit cookie cutter. These models 
use existing data, which makes them cost effective, but they do not necessarily capture the 
dynamics of a place and accommodate local conditions. The custom-built FIAs tend to better 
capture place and any idiosyncrasies of the development, but they are costly because 
detailed data needs to be developed and collected. This can often be a time-consuming 
task, and based on local politics, access to the data may be difficult (Edwards & Huddleston, 
2009). 
 
The other structural component of FIAs, aside from custom versus off-the-shelf models, is 
the need to consider how costs are used in driving impact models. One option is to use 
average costs for projects and investments. While average costs are both easier and 
cheaper to use due to their availability, they may capture less of the true impacts from 
development. Some costs that may not be included in this case are those affected by direct 
investment. These may be indirect costs, such as those that have marginal impacts. An 
example of this is the capacities of systems affected by development, such as water and 
sewer systems, as well as school districts. 
 
County versus Sub-County 
 
One of the dilemmas of many of Fiscal Impact Analysis (FIA) and economic impact models is 
that, at least in the early days, they were based on county-level data. As reported by Farrigan 
et al. (2001), A Fiscal Impact Model for New Hampshire Communities (FIT-4-NH) was 
developed that used the municipal level as the unit of analysis. It used community-level data 
but was more of a short-run model than the more standard cost and benefits model that 
uses net present values (NPV) to assess the fiscal outcomes to investments. In their analysis 
of returns, Farrigan et al. (2001) pointed out that various types of infrastructure respond 
differently to changes in per capita expenditures.  
 
Average versus Marginal Costs 
 
Within the literature, this is a discussion of using average versus marginal costs. Each has 
an implication for understanding fiscal impacts. Average costs are often developed using 
costs from standardized sources. Marginal costs are developed through local data 
collection. In looking at total cost of development, it may be advantageous to use marginal 
cost not only for direct costs and benefits but also for those that are indirect and 
downstream.  “One criticism stems from the frequent use of average costs rather than 
marginal costs to predict the impact of real estate development on future public 




establishes a linear relationship between investment and outcomes. An example of this is 
when new residential units are added to a place; with the development possibly comes new 
students for a school district. Using average costs per student would linearly change 
aggregate costs but not account for the individual conditions in the school. Using marginal 
costs in place of average costs would allow the increase in students to reflect the new total 
costs for service provision. Depending on the current capacity of the district and individual 
schools, the marginal impact may be lower average costs due to available capacity,  no 
significant change to average costs due to optimal student enrollment and capacity, or 
higher marginal costs in places with facilities near capacity and possibly trigger the need for 
additional classrooms and teachers. Similarly, Paulsen (2009) discussed the impacts of 
differing capacity levels and whether new entrants will “congest” public services. 
 
In looking at industrial development, depending on capacities at a package plant and the 
nature of the production process, the impacts of additional sewer lines could range from 
lowering average costs, to being neutral in affecting average costs, to requiring additional 
capacity or services be added to meet the new demand. Adding additional capacity may be 
necessary not only when systems are at or near capacity, but also when new production 
adds unique wastes such as metals (from fabricated metal manufacturing) or starch (from 
food processing) that need nontraditional handling. A marginal cost-based FIA may be best 
used for analysis when the data are available, and the development is likely to have complex 
impacts on the place.  While there is some debate in the literature on returns to 
development, there is a general assumption that new residential development creates costs 
for places while nonresidential development, such as industrial, tends to create surpluses 
(Edwards & Huddleston, 2009). 
 
Read et al. (2019) identified three marginal cost approaches. First is the case study 
approach that requires primary data collection and analysis along with interviews of key 
informants and experts. There is some concern that the data collected through this more 
intense process of case studies may be biased when respondents have preferences among 
projects (Edwards & Huddleston, 2009). Second is the comparable cities method that 
compares development in similar jurisdictions. “Similar” could be based on population 
trends, size, and other characteristics. The third is the employment anticipation method that 
uses regression techniques (including the aforementioned impact models) when 
employment growth and associated multipliers are a function of per capita spending on 
infrastructure. Read, et al. (2019) cited a number of authors in their literature review with 
concerns of econometric modeling including intra-jurisdictional effects, differences in local 
characteristics, and issues with model specifications.  
 
Paulsen (2009) demanded a clear understanding between costs and expenditures that are 
made. “[D]ata simply do not exist consistently on local government input costs. Instead 
reported data represent only expenditures.” (Paulsen, 2009, p. 13). He notes differences 
between places may be based in “different per-unit costs, but may just as likely represent 
different levels of service” (Paulsen, 2009, p. 13). On the revenue side, local governments 
are funded by taxes (primarily property, sales, and income), fees, and user changes 





Infrastructure Development as the Focus of the 
Fiscal Impact Analysis 
  
Much the literature focuses on the impacts of residential development. The costs and 
impacts from residential development are quite different than those of industrial and 
commercial development. While the latter may affect the former, the demands for public 
goods by each type of development are noticeably different. While residential may focus on 
K-12 education, recreation, and other public goods, industrial and commercial development 
often sees demands for public goods more in the area of infrastructure. Most often, local 
governments (and in some cases regional governments) are the primary entities surrounding 
the provision of infrastructure. Alm (2015) noted the juxtaposition posed by infrastructure. 
While high quality infrastructure is essential in sustaining growth, “the delivery of urban 
infrastructure is plagued by persistent and significant problems…[T]he condition of facilities, 
the resulting services, and the financing systems are often poor, and often it is the poor who 
are most affected” (p. 231). He continues by defining infrastructure as “long-lived” capital 
facilities that support both residential and business needs. Alm (2015) also noted that 
infrastructure may be provided by both the public sector and the private sector, which is 
additionally confounded by the condition that some infrastructure is a public good (such as 
local roads) while some may be a private good (such as electricity or broadband).  
 
Finally, infrastructure and decisions around the quality and quantity of infrastructure should 
be decided locally based on the Decentralization Theorem that states “government services 
should be provided by the lowest level of government that can do it efficiently” (Alm, 2015, 
p. 233). Again, this provides support for FIAs to be done at a local level where delivery of 
much infrastructure is based. Many of the articles discussed in this review rely on the 
assumption that people (and firms) will vote with their feet. The origin of this comes from 
Tiebout’s seminal piece in 1956 which stated that users will determine, at least for mobile 
people and capital, the best place to maximize their utility by selecting a bundle of costs 
(taxes and fees) and benefits. Canavire-Bacareza and Martinez-Waquez (2012) discussed 
Tiebout in light of “efficiency in public service provision (being) achieved through mobility 
and sorting of the population in a decentralized government” (p. 6). Such sorting would also 
likely apply to business location decisions. They continue, “sub-national governments are 








A main consideration in creating a Fiscal Impact Analysis is not only the direct cost of 
infrastructure but also how new infrastructure will be funded. It is necessary to not only take 
into account the short-run nature of investment in infrastructure, but also the long-run costs 
of operation and maintenance. The financing of infrastructure can come from three primary 
sources: borrowing, revenue, and transfers from higher forms of government (Alm, 2015). 
Borrowing allows lifecycle finance to come into play as future generations pay for resources 
as they use them rather than early users bearing the costs and later users becoming free 
riders. Borrowing can come from issuing municipal bonds or from specialized financing 
institutions such as State Infrastructure Banks (SIB). Transfers from higher levels of 
government (national, state, or regional) for infrastructure can provide a number of different 
benefits to local government, including but not limited to the ability to “correct for 
externalities” (Alm, 2015).  
 
Chen (2016) did an extensive review of SIBs. It may be useful to note that Ohio has what he 
called a “hybrid” model of SIBs with “separate federally capitalized and state-only 
capitalized accounts” (p. 97). The intent of the SIBs is to finance transportation 
infrastructure using subsidized loans in what is essentially a revolving loan fund. The benefit 
of having a state capitalized SIB is that it helps to reduce borrowing costs and helps address 
state-local (vertical) equity concerns (Chen, 2016). In his conclusion, Chen’s study “finds 
that one dollar of three-year lagged SIB loan disbursements to state and local highway 
project sponsors will increase state and local highway capital expenditures in the current 
year by nearly three dollars” (Chen, 2016, p. 110). He did note that his research is based on 
seven states with federally-capitalized SIBs and does not include outcomes from state-
capitalized SIBs.  
 
An additional method of funding infrastructure is the use of impact fees to cover investment 
and congestion costs (Alm, 2015). This allows for costs of development to be shifted from 
existing users to new users based on the new development. This may be more easily 
accomplished with residential development rather than commercial and industrial 
development. There is a discussion within the literature of a “race to the bottom” by offering 
an array of incentives to attract jobs and business to a place. The concern brought out by 
the concept is that so many incentives are given away that the benefits to the place become 
net negative. However, what if the benefits to the region are net neutral or net positive? Alm 
(2015) suggested that “(I)nter-governmental transfers should be used to finance those 
services that generate spillovers to nearby jurisdictions, since strictly local finance will lead 
to inefficient provision” (p. 244).   
 
 
Within the Euro Zone, Rodriquez-Pose and Garcilazo (2015) found that “EU-financed public 
investment has had a positive and statistically significant link with regional growth, 
independent of the quality of local and regional government” (p. 1280). However, in their 
conclusions they noted that quality of government is important in determining the trajectory 
of growth. While infrastructure creates returns, coupled with good government those returns 







Externalities are outcomes that are not figured into the pricing structure of a project. These 
may be benefits or costs. An example of a positive externality or benefit of development is 
that the development attracts additional investment and jobs into a jurisdiction. While 
possibly an anticipated side effect or spillover, the costs and benefits of the primary project 
were likely the only consideration. On the other hand, the same development may increase 
traffic congestion, increase drive times, and consequently be a negative externality creating 
additional costs to residents. Again, expected remedies and compensation were not 
necessarily part of the cost and benefits included in the FIA.  
 
There are a number of ways that projects in one jurisdiction can cause spillovers or 
externalities and so “fiscal policies of one municipality may have effects reaching beyond its 
political boundaries” (Hettler, 2001, p. 406). These may be positive and/or negative 
externalities to those outside the jurisdiction where development is occurring. “A particular 
public good provided with taxes collected from city residents may provide significant benefits 
to those living outside the city” (Hettler, 2001, p. 411).  Hettler (2001) goes on to note that 
labor markets, and therefore regionalization of wages paid in one place, affect the wages 
paid in other jurisdictions. It is also important to note that while some development (such as 
residential) may allow residents to commute outside of the jurisdiction to shop and work, 
industrial and commercial development may bring in workers in who reside outside the 
jurisdiction (Paulsen, 2009). 
 
Alm (2015) noted that service provision is usually done by small and fragmented 
municipalities in what he called a “one-tier model.” However, he also noted in some places 
that a “two-tier model” may be in place to “be responsible for services that have wide-scale 
benefits, that generate externalities or that demonstrate economies of scale…” (p. 234). 
Another argument for local service provision is that those providing and financing the service 
will be more actively involved in the capital facilities and feel a sense of “ownership” (Alm, 
2015). 
 
As Paulsen (2009) noted, state government sets the “functional service provision 
requirements and obligations among different government levels” (p. 9). Also, he noted 
states set how local jurisdictions may generate revenues. Paulsen referred to this as vertical 
intergovernmental relations. The ability of a place to respond to service provisions and how 
to deal with costs and paying for services is constrained by state governments. Additionally, 
states may limit actual levels of expenditures by local governments by creating debt ceilings, 
but they may also provide financial support through “revenue sharing, grants, school aid, 
equalization formulas and the like” (Paulsen, 2009, p. 10). Horizontal government relations 
are when governments in a region “compete” for residents and employers. To do this they 
may use “tax exemptions, tax expenditures, infrastructure, TIFs, etc.” (Paulsen, 2009, p. 11). 
As noted elsewhere, this competition can lead to spillovers or externalities to other nearby 




decisions that mobile households and owners of mobile capital may make on location 
decisions.  
 
Some of the externalities accrue to other places due to commuters living and working in 
different jurisdictions. Shuai (2010) found in a study in Virginia that 50% of new jobs in a 
county were taken by commuters. Given this, he also noted many of the fiscal benefits (at 
least based on Virginia tax structure) leaked out of the jurisdiction (Shuai, 2010). Based on 
leakage he recommended that “regional governments should cooperate with each other and 
share the costs of incentive packages in industry recruitment,” and it “should be done 
through cooperation by several counties in a highly integrated local economy” (Shuai, 2010, 
p. 47).  
 
The dilemma with externalities is that they may be within the funding district and they may 
extend beyond the funding district. Externalities within the jurisdiction may be dealt with 
through the political, tax, and regulatory process, while those occurring outside of the 






Fiscal Impacts of Sprawl 
 
As mentioned above, both positive and negative externalities are likely to exist both in and 
possibly outside the jurisdiction. However, it is important that if a regional view of the 
economy is taken, the accounting of costs and benefits are included as part of a Fiscal 
Impact Analysis. In most cases, primary fiscal costs and benefits accrue to the local 
jurisdiction, but as mentioned earlier, externalities likely occur and so when regional 
economic impact are considered, the externalities need to be included.  
 
One of the most cited pieces of research in the articles contained in this literature review 
was Does “Smart Growth” Matter to Public Finance? (Carruthers & Ulfarsson, 2007). They 
presented the argument against sprawl and argued that the per unit cost for provision of 
services is higher in low density places. The other side of the argument is the “harshness” of 
dense places overrides the costs. Research cited in their paper has arguments that support 
both positions. In their work they constructed estimates of increased density and less 
expansive use of land and find “the hypothetical savings… are nontrivial enough that places 
may wish to identify how to better connect financial planning to land use planning” 
(Carruthers & Ulfarsson, 2007, p. 17). However, they continued on with the assertion that 
quality services must deliver cost effectively for a place to have a comparative advantage. 
They cautioned that their findings are based on county-level analysis and so should be used 
carefully as it is “not clear that (their) findings would apply exactly the same way on a 
community-by-community basis” (Carruthers & Ulfarsson, 2007, p. 21). They also point out 
that jurisdictions in a region are interdependent and so it is better to cooperate than to 
compete.  
 
Ihlanfeldt and Willardsen (2018) further explored the tradeoff between density of place and 
harshness of the environment by looking at development in counties in Florida. The also 
broke costs down by land use including retail, multi-family, office, and institutional 
properties. “[W]hile there is some evidence on the relationship between costs and urban 
sprawl, we found no evidence on the relationship between costs and the spatial distribution 
of alternative land uses” (Ihlanfeldt & Willardsen, 2018, p. 35). They concluded that, relative 
to the trade-off between density and harshness, “concentrating economic activity creates 
cost savings especially in the provision of public infrastructure and, at the same time, the 
congestion such concentration creates is a source of negative externalities” (Ihlanfeldt & 
Willardsen, 2018, p. 36). 
 
Goodman (2019) noted two components for density: first, that costs of service provision 
may decline due to higher density, but also that high levels of density can create an “urban 
‘harshness’” (p. 5). In the latter there is more congestion and crime among other conditions 
due to harshness. While the first may lead to lower per capita costs, the second may lead to 
higher per capita costs. In his research, Goodman (2019) found that increasing density 
raises per capita costs, but only slightly. “However, holding density constant, per capita 
costs can be reduced by limiting the spatial extent of development…As development 
becomes more uniform across the county, public services costs are reduced” (Goodman, 
2019, p. 14). He additionally suggested that in-fill development can help to keep local 





Goodman (2019) and Ryback (2004) are both concerned with “leapfrog” development that 
reduces density by adding infrastructure in jurisdictions further away from the core and 
bypasses existing parcels with infrastructure. Part of Rybeck’s concern is that landowners 
are able to benefit from infrastructure and there is an ability to profit from future sales 
revenues as the value of land rises. As a measure to counteract sprawl, Rybeck (2004) 
supports a two-tiered system of property tax that supports higher taxes on land and lower 
taxes on buildings (p. 253). 
 
In his conclusion, Rybeck (2004) found that “compact development, by using existing 
infrastructure, conserves natural and financial resources and promotes walking, cycling, and 






Externalities from Agglomeration 
 
Externalities also accrue from increasing the density of economic activity. These may come 
from a diverse bundle of services and suppliers in an urban place. This is referred to as an 
“urbanized” agglomeration. Similarly, when firms in the same industry, including backward 
and forwardly linked industries, locate together they benefit from these linkages, knowledge 
sharing, and labor sharing. This is referred to as a localized economy. While benefits may 
accrue to the firm, and so figure into the pricing structure, others in the jurisdiction and the 
region may benefit. These are referred to as agglomeration externalities.  
 
Gaigné et al., (2013) investigated the role of municipal structures in a region and found the 
economic and institutional/administrative boundaries of a central city are not 
cotemporaneous. They concluded that the right size of a jurisdiction for public services is 
different than for the economic boundaries “whereas the optimal size of central and 
secondary business centers depends on the interplay between commuting and 
agglomeration economies” (Gaigne et al., 2013, p. 4). They continued with the statement 
that the role of a “metropolitan area government is to provide integrated management of 
agglomeration economies by coordinating business tax rates across the wide range of 
jurisdictions” (Gaigne, et al, 2013, p. 4). They concluded, as others have suggested, that 
“small things” should be managed locally while “big things” should be managed at a more 
regional level. “Labor and transportation issues in particular should be handled at the 
metropolitan level” (Gaigne, et al., 2013, p. 4). Finally, they argued that by coordinating the 
supply of public services, the race to the bottom for businesses and residents often warned 
against can be avoided.  
 
He and Romanos (2016) investigated the impact that a variety of determinants have on 
location decisions in the communications manufacturing industry (CEM). Their findings, at 
least for the CEM industry, include that the presence of supply chains, specific industries 
(like industrial machinery manufacturing), and tax differentials all matter in location 
decisions for CEM. While agglomeration economies can be an important factor in the site 
selection process, “agglomeration economies generated by industrial linkages cannot dilute 
the impact of tax differentials on firms’ location decisions” (He & Romanos, 2016, p. 2171). 
They concluded that while both urbanization and localization economies are important, 
higher corporate tax rates can offset those benefits.  
 
Crabbé and De Bruyne (2013), in a comparative study of regions in Belgium, found that 
higher tax rates “repel” new firms while agglomeration economies attract firms. In the 
interaction of the two, they state “A higher ETR (effective tax rate) as such does not 
necessarily deter firms in strongly agglomerated districts” (p. 434). They also found, at least 
in Belgium, that firms want to locate in larger places with assistance. “Ceteris paribus, larger 
districts and districts with more funding will therefore attract more new firms. The 
infrastructure variable finally has no significant impact on the location of new firms” (Crabbe 
& De Bruyne, 2013, p. 436). In the end, places with higher levels of agglomeration can tax 





Wrede (2014) modified this slightly by indicating that different levels of capital in a region 
can be overcome if agglomeration externalities are in place but there is some level of fiscal 
equalization across regions.  It is also found that “per capita fiscal capacity equalization 
cannot simultaneously eliminate public good infrastructure and spatial inefficiency” (Wrede, 
2013, p. 1026). Kessides and Ingram (1995) noted that “(I)nfrastructure is a necessary, 
though not sufficient precondition for growth—adequate complements of other resources 
must be present as well” (p. 18) and “high quality, reliable infrastructure services are also 
critical for modernization and diversification of production (p. 20). 
 
In a study based on Portugal, Pereira and Andraz (2011) noted that road investments have a 
positive impact on employment in most regions of the country. Looking across all regions in 
the country, they estimated a 3.9:1 return over a 30-year period to the country from road 
investments. This ranges from a high of 5.58:1 in Lisbon to a low of -0.06 in Alentejo 
(Pereira & Andraz, 2011, p. 487). Similarly, the multipliers are quite high for both 
employment and output. They also note that investment in other regions yields returns to 
each study region.  
 
Otsuka and Goto (2015) found similar results for Japan. Industry agglomeration has positive 
effects on manufacturing, as does market access. Therefore, investments in roads can help 
connect regions outside of the Tokyo region and provide access to markets by the goods 
producing sectors. Their study also found that population density was important in 
increasing manufacturing productivity. They found that “it is essential to increase population 
concentration in areas within a region in order to realize regional economic growth. For this 
purpose, it is necessary to enhance the economies of agglomeration (Otsuka & Goto, 2015, 
p. 530).  
 
Using econometric modeling, Hortas-Rico (2013) found fiscal benefits exceed the cost of 
public services in Spain. This is at least partially true due to intergovernmental transfers to 
municipalities from higher levels of government. This allows local governments to plan for 
lower densities in areas “without necessarily considering the full fiscal, social and 






Implications from COVID-19 
 
While agglomeration brings with it many benefits, the allure of cities and close contact 
among firms and workers is called into question in the face of the COVID-19 pandemic. Even 
before the COVID-19 crisis, large metropolitan areas and urban cores were facing a declining 
population. Between 2018 and 2019, almost half (44.1 %) of the 68 urban core counties 
with populations exceeding 500,000 people registered a loss in population (Frey, 2020). 
Individuals have left dense urban areas for a variety of reasons including expensive rents, 
lack of wage growth for low- and middle-wage workers, and a high cost of living (Tavernise & 
Mervosh, 2020). It is quite possible that COVID-19 may accelerate the depopulation trends 
seen since the mid-2010’s.   
  
As workers leave cities, this will have an impact on where business is done. In a recent poll 
by Gallup, 58% of managers indicated their employees were currently working remotely, with 
about half (52%) expecting workers to continue to work from home, at least some of the 
time, after restrictions are lifted (Harter, 2020). Boosting worker confidence in returning to 
the office is likely to include such measures as reducing the number of staff in the office at 
any one time and promoting social distancing through the end of open-plan workplaces 
(Muddit, 2020). Measures that are used to reduce the spread of COVID-19 may, at the same 
time, dull the benefits of agglomeration as they remove the close contact and clustering of 
people that enable the benefits of agglomeration to flow between people and firms.   
 
Dense urban areas have been praised for providing many benefits including better 
accessibility to services and jobs, public transportation systems, efficient infrastructure 
investments, sustainability, and serving as hubs for knowledge and economic growth (OECD, 
2012). However, in the wake of the global pandemic, debates have emerged as to whether 
densely populated areas are more vulnerable to spreading the COVID-19 virus due to the 
close proximity of residents and difficulty in applying social distancing measures (OECD, 
2020). The Great Lockdown hit employment in cities unexpectedly hard with 84% of the jobs 
lost between February and March in cities with populations over 250,000 (Berube, 2020). 








Conducting a Fiscal Impact Analysis (FIA) is essential before beginning any project. While 
local governments are not necessarily in the business of making a profit from development, 
any cost and related losses from a project should be recognized and part of the political 
process of decision making within a jurisdiction.  
 
There are a number of approaches to doing FIAs; the first step is deciding between off-the-
shelf models versus custom models. The former is easily applied and cost effective but does 
not necessarily address local issues and impacts in detail. In either case, FIAs need to either 
be based in average costs or marginal costs. The strength of using average costs is they are 
easy and relatively inexpensive to obtain, but the costs will be estimates of factors of 
development, not necessarily the actual cost. Conversely, marginal costs are more difficult 
to develop and more costly. There is also a potential that the source of the data may have a 
bias, either as a pro or con regarding the project, so information may also be biased. The 
strength of using marginal costs is if they are extended to issues like how capacities in 
schools and public services are affected, a broader set of costs may be better understood. 
 
At the very base level, FIAs should reflect the costs and benefits to the local government. 
Included in the FIA should not only be the actual costs of development, but also the 
operational and other long-run costs. In addition, how the public sector side of the 
development will be funded is important, particularly if the costs are funded by the debt 
capacity of the jurisdiction. Issuing debt for projects is both a question of fiscal capacity and 
the ability to borrow, but also the willingness to borrow. 
 
While the application of the FIA is primarily a function of a jurisdiction like a city or township, 
the development may have broader implications outside the jurisdiction. Since these are not 
part of the pricing structure of the project, these externalities (both positive and negative) 
may spillover into the rest of the region and should be part of the impact analysis. At some 
point, and when scale becomes a factor, the FIA moves more into the economic impact 
analysis (EIA) of regionwide impacts.  
 
Development that capitalizes on localized and/or urbanized agglomeration economies can 
provide benefits (and costs) not only to the city or township, but also to the region. These are 
referred to as agglomeration externalities. In this case, people and firms outside the region 
may benefit from development but not contribute to the cost and can become free riders. 
Due to the costs of sprawl and harshness to the environment some of these externalities 
may either be mitigated or enhanced.  
 
In the end, development by place will have fiscal impacts and benefits for the jurisdiction 
but may also have externalities that spread beyond the borders of the city or township. 
Depending on the type of investment and project, the unit of analysis chosen to conduct 
FIAs will vary according to whom the costs are born, and the benefits accrue.   
 
A caveat to this research is that the literature was primarily based on pre-COVID-19 




density. As discussed at the end, recent experience has shown that higher density places, at 
least initially, experienced higher levels of the population contracting the disease. Going 
forward, it is unclear how both people and businesses will respond to living and working in 
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About the Upjohn Institute 
 
The W.E. Upjohn Unemployment Trustee Corporation was incorporated on October 24, 
1932, as a Michigan 501(c)(3) nonprofit corporation, and is doing business as the W.E. 
Upjohn Institute for Employment Research. The W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment 
Research has been conducting economic research and consultation for 75 years, since its 
founding in 1945. 
 
The Upjohn Institute is governed by a Board of Trustees, which employs a President who is 
responsible for the overall operation of the Institute. The President of the Upjohn Institute is 
Dr. Michael Horrigan.  
 
The Upjohn Institute currently employs 104 individuals. Upjohn’s research and consultation 
program is conducted by a resident staff of professional social scientists, 12 of whom are 
Ph.D.-level economists (senior staff). Senior staff is supported by a staff of research analysts 
and additional support staff. Upjohn also administers the federal and state employment 
programs for its four-county area through the local Workforce Investment Board. Upjohn also 
publishes books on economic development, workforce development, and other employment-
related topics.   
 
The Ph.D.-level economists have more than 175 years of collective experience, conducting 
research on a broad variety of economic and employment topics. Their experience includes, 
but is not limited to, employment program evaluation, labor market dynamics, labor-
management relations, employment and training programs, economic and workforce 
development, income replacement policy, worker adjustment, the role of education in labor 
markets, employment and compensation, disability, international comparison of labor 
adjustment policies, site selection experience, and state, regional, and local economic 
analysis.   
 
The Upjohn Institute also has a Regional Economic and Planning Services team of 
specialists who provide economic insights and analysis regionally and statewide in Michigan, 
in other individual states, and nationally. The team has experience in:  
• Economic impact analysis 
• Fiscal/cost-benefit impact analysis 
• Labor market analysis 
• Facilitating and conducting effective one-on-one interviews, focus groups, workshops, 
and charrette sessions in a diverse array of environments  
• Economic and workforce development and education strategies 
• GIS mapping abilities 
• Rural and urban land use and economic development planning services 
• Regional data analysis   
 
For questions or information about this report, contact Jim Robey, Director of Regional and 
Planning Economic Services, 269-365-0450, or jrobey@upjohn.org.  
